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Robert Aumann’s and Thomas Schelling’s 
Contributions to Game Theory: 
Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation 1. Introduction
Wars and other conﬂicts are among the main sources of human misery. A minimum
of cooperation is a prerequisite for a prosperous society. Life in an anarchic “state
of nature” with its struggle of every man against every man is, in Thomas Hobbes’
(1651) famous phrase, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”.
Social scientists have long attempted to understand the fundamental causes of
conﬂict and cooperation. The advent of game theory in the middle of the twentieth
century led to major new insights and enabled researchers to analyze the subject
with mathematical rigor. The foundations of game theory were laid out in the classic
book by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, published in 1944. The 1994 economics laureates John Harsanyi,
John Nash and Reinhard Selten added solution concepts and insights that substan-
tially enhanced the usefulness and predictive power of non-cooperative game theory.
The most central solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium. A strategy combi-
nation (one strategy for each player) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if each player’s
strategy is optimal against the other players’ strategies.1 Harsanyi showed that this
solution concept could be generalized to games of incomplete information (that is,
where players do not know each others’ preferences). Selten demonstrated that it
could be reﬁned for dynamic games and for games where players make mistakes with
(inﬁnitesimally) small probabilities. Nevertheless, the great intellectual achievements
of these researchers would have been to little avail, had game-theoretic tools not been
applied to address salient questions about society.
The work of two researchers, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling, was
essential in developing non-cooperative game theory further and bringing it to bear
1A non-cooperative game in normal form consists of a list of players, a set of strategies available
to each player, and a function that speciﬁes the payo consequences to all players of each strategy
combination.
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on major questions in the social sciences.2 Approaching the subject from digerent
angles–Aumann from mathematics and Schelling from economics–they both per-
ceived that the game-theoretic perspective had the potential to reshape the analysis
of human interaction. Perhaps most importantly, Schelling showed that many famil-
iar social interactions could be viewed as non-cooperative games that involve both
common and conﬂicting interests, and Aumann demonstrated that long-run social
interaction could be comprehensively analyzed using formal non-cooperative game
theory.
Although their writings on conﬂict and cooperation were well received when they
appeared in the late 1950s, it took a long time before Aumann’s and Schelling’s visions
came to be fully realized. The delay reﬂects both the originality of their contributions
and the steepness of the subsequent steps. Eventually, and especially over the last
twenty-ﬁve years, game theory has become a universally accepted tool and language in
economics and in many areas of the other social sciences. Current economic analysis of
conﬂict and cooperation builds almost uniformly on the foundations laid by Aumann
and Schelling.
2. Schelling
Thomas Schelling’s book T h eS t r a t e g yo fC o n ﬂ i c t(1960) launched his vision of game
theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Turning attention away from
zero-sum games, such as chess, where players have diametrically opposed interests, he
emphasized the fact that almost all multi-person decision problems contain a mixture
of conﬂicting and common interests, and that the interplay between the two concerns
could be egectively analyzed by means of non-cooperative game theory. The stage
had been set by Nash (1950a,1951), who had proven that there exist (Nash) equilibria
in all games with ﬁnitely many pure strategies. Schelling took on the complementary
task of deducing the equilibria for interesting classes of games and evaluating whether
these games and their equilibria were instructive regarding actual economic and social
interaction. He did this against the background of the world’s ﬁrst nuclear arms race
and came to contribute greatly to our understanding of its implications.
2While cooperative game theory starts out from a set of potential binding agreements and play-
ers’ preferences over them, non-cooperative game theory starts out from players’ strategy sets and
preferences over the associated outcomes.3
2.1. Conﬂict, commitment and coordination. Schelling’s earliest major con-
tribution is his analysis of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations, ﬁrst published
as an article (Schelling, 1956) and later reprinted as Chapter 2 of Schelling (1960).
Here, bargaining is interpreted broadly: besides explicit negotiations–for example
between two countries or between a seller and a buyer–there is also “bargaining”
when two trucks loaded with dynamite meet on a road wide enough for one, to cite
one of Schelling’s characteristically graphical examples.
Bargaining always entails some conﬂict of interest in that each party usually seeks
an agreement that is as favorable as possible. Yet, any agreement is better for both
parties than no agreement at all. Each player has to balance the quest for a large
“share of the pie” against the concern for agreement. When Schelling wrote his article,
economists’ work on bargaining had typically taken a cooperative or normative ap-
proach, by asking questions such as: what is a fair outcome? An exception was Nash,
who modeled bargaining both with a cooperative (Nash 1950b) and a non-cooperative
(Nash, 1953) approach. While Nash’s formulations allow elegant mathematical analy-
ses by way of abstracting from many realistic bargaining tactics, Schelling examines
the bargaining tactics a player can use in order to tilt the outcome in his or her favor
– emphasizing in particular that it may be advantageous to worsen one’s own options
in order to elicit concessions from the opponent. It can be wise for a general to burn
bridges behind his troops as a credible commitment towards the enemy not to retreat.
Similarly, the owners of a ﬁrm may proﬁtably appoint a manager with limited powers
to negotiate, and a politician may gain from making public promises that would be
embarrassing to break. Such tactics work if the commitment is irreversible or can
only be undone at great cost, while commitments that are cheap to reverse will not
elicit large concessions. However, if both parties make irreversible and incompatible
commitments, harmful disagreement may follow.
Let us illustrate some of the key issues by means of a stylized and simple example.
Suppose that two countries disagree over the right to a patch of territory.3 Each
country can choose to mobilize military force or refrain from doing so. If both mobilize
there is a high probability of war, while the probability of a peaceful agreement about
3For more elaborate game-theoretic analyses of commitment in bargaining, see for example Craw-
ford (1982), Muthoo (1996), and G¨ uth, Ritzberger and van Damme (2004).4
division of the territory is low. Let the expected payog to each country be zero if both
mobilize. If instead both countries refrain from mobilization, a peaceful agreement
about division of the territory has a high probability, while the probability of war
is small. In this case, each country obtains a positive expected payog e. However,
if only one country mobilizes, it can take complete control of the territory without
war, and neither the other country nor any other party can force a military retreat
by the occupant. The aggressor obtains payog d while the loser’s payog is f,w h e r e
dAeAfA0, war thus being the worst outcome.4 This simple “mobilization game”
can be described by the following payog bi-matrix, where one player (here country)
chooses a row and the other simultaneously chooses a column, with the row player’s





This game belongs to a class of games known as “Chicken,” sometimes called “Hawk-
Dove.” Such games have three Nash equilibria: two pure and one mixed. The pure
equilibria entail mobilization by exactly one country; if one country expects the other
to mobilize, then it is optimal to refrain from mobilization. The mixed equilibrium
entails randomized mobilization by each country and thus a positive probability of
war.
The pure equilibria are plausible in situations where the two countries have some
means to coordinate on either equilibrium. For example, a small perturbation of the
game that would create even a tiny asymmetry in the payogs, may be enough for
both players to expect mobilization by the player who has the most to gain from
it, thus rendering that equilibrium “salient” or “focal.” According to Schelling, it
is likely that humans are capable of such coordination in many situations, while a
purely formal analysis is likely to be unable to capture the principles of salience or
4In some conﬂict situations, war is less undesirable than the humiliation that may be associated
with lack of mobilization when the other country mobilizes. In such situations, dAeA0 Af ,a n d
the game becomes a prisoners’ dilemma, with mutual mobilization as the outcome, see section 3.1.5
focality in the game in question: “One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce
what understandings can be perceived in a non-zero sum game of maneuver any more
than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be
funny” is a famous quote by Schelling (1960, p.164). Instead, equilibrium selection
is “an area where experimental psychology can contribute to game theory” (ibid.
p.113).5
Absent any commonly understood coordination principle, the game’s mixed equi-
librium appears more plausible. Each country is then uncertain about the other’s
move, assigning some probability s to the event that the other country will mobilize.
The Nash equilibrium probability of mobilization is s =( de)@(de+f), rendering
each country indigerent whether to mobilize.6 It follows that, for plausible parameter
values, the probability of war is decreasing in the loser’s payog f; the key to minimiz-
ing the risk of war is not only to contain the winner’s gain but equally importantly
to improve the loser’s payog.7
Mobilizing and threatening to mobilize are not equivalent. A formal analysis of
deterrence is complicated and requires specifying a dynamic game with several stages,
but with Schelling’s intuition as a guide it is possible to proceed without detailed
mathematics. The study of credible deterrence through so-called “second-strike”
strategies takes up a major part of The Strategy of Conﬂict. Schelling emphasizes
that investments in deterrence can become dangerous in case of false warnings as well
as when misjudging the adversary’s interests and intentions.
Suppose that Country 1 can pre-commit to mobilize if Country 2 mobilizes. More
precisely: ﬁrst Country 1 chooses whether to refrain from mobilization altogether
or to commit to mobilize if and only if Country 2 mobilizes. Thereafter, Country 2
observes 1’s move and decides whether or not to mobilize. If payogs are as described in
5By now, there is a sizeable experimental literature on focal points in bargaining as well as in
other games, much of it informed and inspired by Schelling. We return to the coordination problem
below.
6Mobilizing yields expected payo (1  s)d, while refraining yields sf +( 1 s)e.E q u a t i n gt h e
two determines the equilibrium probability s.
7By statistical independence between the two players’ randomization, the probability for war is
t = s2 +( 1 s)
2 ,w h e r e is the probability for war when both countries mobilize and ?
the probability for war when no country mobilizes. It follows that t is increasing in s for all
sA @( + ). Hence t is decreasing in f if f?(d  e)@.6
Table 1, the (subgame perfect) equilibrium outcome will be that Country 1 makes the
mobilization commitment, and both countries refrain from mobilization. Indeed, it is
sucient that Country one commits to mobilize with a suciently high probability.8
Such deterrence thus guarantees a peaceful outcome–a balance of terror.
Suppose, moreover, that Country 1 is uncertain whether Country 2 actually prefers
war to the negotiated outcome. In the game-theoretic parlance (based on Harsanyi’s
work), Country 1 now has incomplete information about Country 2’s payogs. Should
Country 1 still commit to mobilize if country Country 2 mobilizes? Schelling’s analysis
reveals that the optimal commitment strategy is then often to choose a probability of
mobilization that is less than one. In other words, in the face of an enemy’s military
escalation, a country should threaten to let the situation “slip out of hand” rather
than commit to certain retaliation, or in Schelling’s words, make “threats that leave
some things to chance.” The reason is that a modest probability of war may be enough
to deter the enemy’s mobilization.9
Another virtue of uncertain retaliation threats is that credibility is easier to attain
the smaller is the own expected retaliation cost. In fact, Schelling suggested that a
good way to meet enemy aggression is to engage in “brinkmanship” — gradually step-
ping up the probability of open conﬂict. Since each step is small, credibility can be
sustained by the anger and outrage that builds steadily against an unrelenting oppo-
nent, and since the opponent can reduce the probability of conﬂict by relenting, the
probability of conﬂict is kept low. As Schelling observed, most children understand
brinkmanship perfectly.
The above analysis implies that countries should keep the adversary guessing
about their response to aggression, at the same time ensuring that forceful retaliation
8Suppose Country 1 can commit to any probability  5 [0>1] of retaliation if Country 2 mobilizes.
If Country 2’s preferences are as in Table 1, deterrence requires that e  (1  )d or, equivalently,
that   1  e@d = .
9Let  be the probability that Country 1 attaches to the possibility that Country 2 prefers to
mobilize regardless of the retaliation threat. For ? , Country 2 will still mobilize for sure, so
the payo to Country 1 is then (1  )f, a decreasing function of .F o r   its expected payo
is (1  )f +( 1 )e, again a decreasing function of . Hence, deterrence (choosing  = )i s
optimal for Country 1 if and only if (1  )f +( 1 )e is at least as large as the payo f from
not retaliating ( = 0), or, equivalently, if and only if   (1  f@e)@(1  f@d)=7
is regarded as a real option. Two other insights are also quite immediate. First,
deterrence only works when retaliatory weapons can be shielded in case of an enemy
attack; war prevention thus requires invulnerable basing of weapons–such as missile
silos–rather than protection of population centers. Second, instability is dangerous.
The balance of terror is maintained only as long as retaliation is suciently probable
and harsh compared to the gains from occupation. War can be ignited by changes in
preferences as well as in technology, and successful attempts at disarmament have to
be balanced throughout.
Schelling’s analysis of “credible commitments” demonstrated that some Nash
equilibria are more plausible than others, inspiring Reinhard Selten’s subgame per-
fection reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept.10 Schelling’s and Selten’s work
on strategic commitment initiated a lively economics literature. The analyses of
strategic investment in oligopoly markets developed by, among others, Avinash Dixit
and Schelling’s student Michael Spence (a 2001 laureate) are leading examples of ap-
p l i e dw o r ko nc o m m i t m e n tt h a tt o o ko g in the late 1970s (see, for example, Spence,
1977, and Dixit, 1980). Their analyses show that a ﬁrm operating in an imperfectly
competitive market can increase its proﬁts by changing its cost structure, even if its
unit production cost increases as a result. For example, a ﬁrm can credibly commit
to a high volume of output by investing in an expensive plant with low marginal
costs. Even if average costs thereby go up, losses due to inecient production can be
outweighed by the gains generated by competitors’ less aggressive behavior.
The literature on monetary policy institutions provides another example of the
idea of strategic commitment at work. Here, the major point is that under certain
circumstances, voters and politicians are better og delegating monetary policy to de-
cision makers with other preferences than their own. Since ﬁrms and trade unions
take the expected monetary policy into account when setting prices and wages, an in-
dependent central banker can be superior to an elected politician even if the politician
10A Nash equilibrium in an extensive-form game is subgame perfect (Selten, 1965) if it induces a
Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Since Nash equilibrium only requires optimality on the path of
play, Nash equilibria may well rely on “threats” or “promises” that will not subsequently materialize.
Subgame perfection eliminates many such equilibria, and, in later work Selten (1975) developed a
stronger reﬁnement, “perfection.”8
at each point in time would act in accordance with the current public interest.11
Sometimes conﬂicts of interest may appear so strong as to be insoluble. The best
strategy for an individual may result in the worst outcome for a group. The short-
run gains from cheating on an agreement might by far outweigh the short-run losses.
Schelling (1956) noted that “What makes many agreements enforceable is only the
recognition of future opportunities for agreement that will be eliminated if mutual
trust is not created and maintained, and whose value outweighs the momentary gain
from cheating in the present instance.” (op. cit. p. 301). Thus, if the parties take
a long perspective and do in fact interact repeatedly, their common interests may be
suciently strong to sustain cooperation. In fact, Schelling went further: “Even if
the future will bring no recurrence, it may be possible to create the equivalence of
continuity by dividing the bargaining issue into consecutive parts.” That is, people
can structure their relationships, by extending interaction over time, in such a way
as to reduce the incentive to behave opportunistically at each point in time.
When Schelling ﬁrst made these observations and conjectures, game theory had
not advanced far enough to allow him to articulate them precisely, far less prove
them. Gradually, however, the literature on repeated games and “Folk Theorems”
(discussed below) demonstrated how present cooperation can be credibly sustained
by the threat of conﬂict in similar situations in the future. As for Schelling’s assertion
that it is sometimes possible to sustain agreement by decomposing one large coop-
erative action into several small ones, it took the profession more than forty years
to fully develop the formal argument. Lockwood and Thomas (2002) demonstrate in
a two-player model that private provision of public goods can often be substantially
higher if the parties can take turns contributing than if they can only make one round
of contributions each.12 By gradually increasing their contribution, implicitly threat-
ening to stop the increase if the other does so, each party holds out a carrot to the
other. However, fully ecient contribution levels are only attainable under strong
additional assumptions, such as zero discounting (Gale, 2001) or non-smooth payog
11Last year’s economics prize was awarded to Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott in part for
having identiﬁed and analyzed problems of commitment in economic policy-making. The macroeco-
nomic literature on delegation is largely inspired by their work, see e.g. Rogo (1985).
12Admati and Perry (1991) were the ﬁrst to tackle the problem head on, but their analysis
considered a fairly special environment and only yielded weak support for Schelling’s conjecture.9
functions (Marx and Matthews, 2000). These analyses can potentially explain why
progress is necessarily gradual in many areas where cooperative actions are costly
to reverse. Examples include military disarmament, environmental cooperation, and
shrinkage of production capacity in a declining market.
Gradual cooperation occurs not only among humans. The biologist John Maynard
Smith describes the mating behavior of the black hamlet, a hermaphrodite coral reef
ﬁsh which carries both sperm and eggs simultaneously (Maynard Smith, 1982, pages
159-160). When the ﬁsh mates, it engages in several rounds of “egg trading” where it
alternately lays eggs and fertilizes the eggs of its partner. The proposed explanation
is that it is cheaper to produce sperm than eggs, so if all eggs were being laid at
once, the ﬁsh playing the male role in this ﬁrst round might not produce any eggs
thereafter, preferring instead to play the male role again with another ﬁsh willing
to produce eggs. By saving some eggs to be used as a reward for the other ﬁsh’s
eggs, each ﬁsh lowers the partner’s incentive to defect. This is but one example from
evolutionary biology where Schelling’s analysis has relevance.
Schelling also studied a class of social interactions that involve little or no conﬂict
of interest, so-called pure coordination games. These are games where all players
prefer coordination on some joint course of action and no player cares about which
coordinated course of action is taken. For example, it may not matter to a team
of workers who carries out which task, as long as the team gets its job done. In
this case, coordination may be easy if players can communicate with each other but
appears dicult without communication. By experimenting with his students and
colleagues, Schelling discovered that they were often able to coordinate rather well
without communicating even in unfamiliar games that had an abundance of Nash
equilibria. As an example, consider the game where two people are asked to select a
positive integer each. If they choose the same integer both get an award, otherwise
no award is given. In such a setting, the majority tends to select the number 1. This
number is distinctive, since it is the smallest positive integer. Likewise, in many other
settings, Schelling’s experimental subjects were able to utilize contextual details, joint
references, and empathy in order to identify “focal” equilibria.13 It seems likely that
13Subsequent attempts to discover fundamental coordination principles include Mehta, Starmer
and Sugden (1994a,b). Camerer (2003, Chapter 7), gives an overview of coordination experiments.10
many social conventions and organizational arrangements have emerged because they
facilitate coordination. Inspired by Schelling’s analysis of coordination in common
interest games, the philosopher David Lewis speciﬁed the compelling hypothesis that
language itself has emerged as a convention (Lewis, 1969).
A ﬁnal interesting class of social decision problems are interactions in which par-
ticipants are mutually distrustful. For example, two generals may both agree that
war is undesirable, and will hence prepare for peace as long as they both think that
the other will do likewise. Yet, if one general suspects that the other is preparing
for war, then his best response may be to prepare for war as well–when war is less
undesirable than being occupied.14 As Schelling (1966, page 261) notes, this idea had
already been clearly formulated by Xenophon (in the fourth century B.C.). A more
recent version of the argument is due to Wohlstetter (1959), who in turn inspired
Schelling. The analysis was advanced by Schelling (1960, Chapter 9), who expressed
it in game-theoretic terms and considered explicitly the role of uncertainty in trig-
gering aggression. To illustrate the possibility that war is caused solely by mutual
distrust, consider the following payog bi-matrix (the ﬁrst number in each entry being





Each player has the choice between going to war and behaving peacefully. The two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (War, War) and (Peace, Peace). If players are ra-
tional, carry out their plans perfectly, and have no uncertainty about the opponent’s
payog, Schelling (1960, p.210) thought that peace would be the most plausible out-
come of such a game (a position that is not shared by all game theorists). However,
Schelling (1960, p.207) also contended that a small amount of nervousness about the
opponent’s intentions could be contagious enough to make the peaceful equilibrium
crumble: “If I go downstairs to investigate a noise at night, with a gun in my hand,
For recent theoretical work, see Binmore and Samuelson (2005).
14This was not the case in the previous example, where war was the worst outome.11
and ﬁnd myself face to face with a burglar who has a gun in his hand, there is a
danger of an outcome that neither of us desires. Even if he prefers just to leave
quietly, and I wish him to, there is danger that he may think I want to shoot, and
shoot ﬁrst. Worse, there is danger that he may think that I think he wants to shoot.”
Schelling did attempt a formal analysis of this surprise attack dilemma, but since
game theory at that time lacked a proper framework for studying games with incom-
plete information, it is fair to say that his modeling did less than full justice to his
intuition.15
T h eS t r a t e g yo fC o n ﬂ i c thas had a lasting inﬂuence on the economics profession
as well as on other social sciences. It has inspired, among other things, the detailed
analysis of bargaining in historical crisis situations (see e.g. Snyder and Diesing,
1977). The book and its sequels Strategy and Arms Control (1961, coauthored with
Morton Halperin) and Arms and Inﬂuence (1966), also had a profound impact on
military theorists and practitioners in the cold war era, played a major role in estab-
lishing “strategic studies” as an academic ﬁeld of study, and may well have contributed
signiﬁcantly to deterrence and disarmament among the superpowers.16
2.2. Other contributions. Over the forty-ﬁve years since the publication of The
Strategy of Conﬂict, Thomas Schelling has continued to produce a series of novel and
useful ideas. We brieﬂy mention two of them here.
In a much cited article from 1971, Schelling analyzed how racially mixed societies
and neighborhoods can suddenly become segregated as the proportion of inhabitants
of one race gradually slides below a critical level. A modest preference for not form-
ing part of a minority in one’s neighborhood, but not necessarily favoring dominance
of one’s own race, can cause small microshocks to have drastic consequences at the
macro level. Besides providing a convincing account of an important social policy
problem, Schelling here ogers an early analysis of “tipping”–the rapid movement
from one equilibrium to another–in social situations involving a large number of in-
15Recently, Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2004) have provided a formal analysis.
16The secrecy surrounding military issues makes it dicult to assess the exact impact of Schelling’s
work on the behavior of superpowers. However, a clue is that in 1993 Schelling won the National
Academy of Sciences (U.S.) Award for Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear
War.12
dividuals. The tipping phenomenon is pursued in several digerent contexts in another
of Schelling’s inﬂuential books, Micromotives and Macrobehavior from 1978, and has
been further analyzed by other social scientists.
The next seminal set of ideas is explored in a sequence of articles on self-command,
notably Schelling (1980, 1983, 1984a, 1992).17 Here, Schelling observes that we do
many things that we wish we would rather not do, for example smoking and drinking
too much or exercising and saving too little. He also explores the limits of self-
management and the associated challenges for public policy. Interestingly, the im-
portance of credible commitments is no smaller in this context of intrapersonal con-
ﬂicts than in the interpersonal conﬂicts which occupied Schelling at the beginning
of his career. Over the last decade, with the rise of behavioral economics, the issue
of limited self-command has received widespread attention.18 There are now many
papers in leading economics journals on procrastination, under-saving, and unhealthy
consumption.
In sum: the “errant economist” (as Schelling has called himself) turned out to be
a pre-eminent pathﬁnder.
3. Aumann
Robert Aumann has played an essential role in shaping game theory. He has pro-
moted a uniﬁed view of the very wide domain of strategic interactions, encompassing
many apparently disparate disciplines, such as economics, political science, biology,
philosophy, computer science and statistics. Instead of using digerent constructs to
deal with various speciﬁc issues–such as deterrence, perfect competition, oligopoly,
taxation and voting–Aumann has developed general methodologies and investigated
where these lead in each speciﬁc application. His research is characterized by an
unusual combination of breadth and depth. Some contributions contain involved
analysis while others are technically simple but conceptually profound. His funda-
mental works have both clariﬁed the internal logic of game-theoretic reasoning and
expanded game theory’s domain of applicability.
17The ﬁrst two of these are reprinted as Chapters 3 and 4 in Schelling (1984b).
18For early formal analyses of such problems, see e.g. Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968).13
3.1. Long-term cooperation. Among Aumann’s many contributions, the study
of long-term cooperation has arguably had the most profound impact on the social
sciences. As pointed out above, a great deal of interaction is long-term in nature,
sometimes of indeﬁnite duration. Countries often have an opportunity to gain some
advantage at their neighbors’ expense. Competing ﬁrms may take daily or monthly
production and pricing decisions, conditioned in part on their competitors’ past be-
havior. Farmers may join together to manage some common resource, such as a
pasture or water source, etc. It is therefore important to study recurrent interaction
with a long horizon.
The digerence between short-term and long-term interaction is perhaps most eas-
ily illustrated by the well-known prisoners’ dilemma game. This is a two-person game,
where each player has two pure strategies, to “cooperate” (C) or “defect” (D). The
players choose their strategies simultaneously. Each player’s dominant strategy is
D–that is, D is an optimal strategy irrespective of the other’s strategy–but both
players gain if they both play C. When played once, the game thus admits only one
Nash equilibrium: that both players “defect.” However, the equilibrium outcome is
worse for both players than the strategy pair where both “cooperate.” An example
is given by the following payog bi-matrix, where, as before, the ﬁrst number in each






Suppose that the same two players meet every day, playing the prisoner’ dilemma
over and over again, seeking to maximize the average daily payog stream over the
inﬁnite future. In this case, it can be shown that cooperation in every period is an
equilibrium outcome. The reason is that players can now threaten to punish any
19The payos are assumed to be von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities truly capturing the motives
of the players. If the payos are monetary instead, it is perfectly possible that a rational player
would choose C out of of concern for the other player’s income.14
deviation from cooperative play today by refusing to cooperate in the future. That
is, the short-term gain from defection today is more than outweighed by the reduction
in future cooperation.
In fact, Aumann (1959) proved a much more general result, concerning any “su-
pergame” JW that consists of the inﬁnite repetition of any given game J. Essentially,
he showed that any average payog that is feasible in the supergame and does not
violate individual rationality (see below) in the “stage game” J can be sustained as
a Nash equilibrium outcome in JW. Moreover, he demonstrated that the result holds
even if robustness is required with respect to joint deviations by coalitions of players.
Let us state the result more precisely. A pure strategy in JW is a decision rule that
assigns a pure strategy in J to each period and for every history of play up to that
period. The set of pure strategies in JW is thus inﬁnite and contains very complex
strategies. The main result of the paper speciﬁes exactly the set of strong equilibrium
payogso fJW.20 A strong equilibrium, a solution concept due to Aumann (1959), is a
strategy proﬁle such that no group (subset, coalition) of players can, by changing its
own strategies, obtain higher payogs to all members of the group.21 Nash equilibrium
is thus the special case in which the deviating group always consists of exactly one
player. Aumann showed that the set of strong equilibrium payogsc o i n c i d e sw i t ht h e
so-called -core of the game J that is being repeated. The -core, a version of the
core, essentially requires that no group of players can guarantee themselves higher
payogs–even if the others would “gang up” against them.
When Aumann’s result is applied to deviating groups of size one, the result is a
so-called Folk Theorem for repeated games. According to this theorem, the set of
Nash equilibrium payogs of an inﬁnitely repeated game JW coincides with the set of
feasible and individually rational payogs. A payog vector–a list of payogs, one for
each player– is feasible if it is the convex combination of payog vectors that can be
obtained by means of pure strategies in J,a n dap a y o g level is individually rational
for a player if it is not less than the lowest payog in J to which the other players
can “force” the player down.22 The gist of the argument is to provide strategies in
20Aumann deﬁnes payosi nJ by means of a certain limit of time averages of payosi nJ.
21Not all games have such equilibria.
22The set of individually rational payos can be deﬁned as follows. For each (pure or mixed)
strategy combination of the other players in J, let the player in question play a (pure or mixed)15
JW that constitute “threats” against deviations from strategies in JW that implement
the given payog vector.
In the prisoners’ dilemma considered here, the set of feasible and individually
rational payog pairs consists of all payog pairs that can be obtained as convex com-
binations of the payog pairs in Table 3 and where no payog is below 1. To see this,
ﬁrst note that each player can guarantee himself a payog of at least 1 by playing
G. Second, the four pure-strategy pairs result in payog pairs (2>2), (1>1), (3>0) and
(0>3). The set of feasible payog pairs is thus the polyhedron with these pairs as
vertices. The shaded area in Figure 1 below is the intersection of these two sets. All
these payog pairs, and no others, can be obtained as time-average payogsi nN a s h







Figure 1: The set of feasible and individually rational payog pairs in the prisoners’
dilemma game in Table 3.
Applied to the game in Table 1, the Folk Theorem claims that all payog pairs
that are convex combinations of (0>0), (d>f), (f>d)a n d( e>e), and where no payog is
best reply. The minimal value among the resulting payos to the latter deﬁnes the lower bound on
that player’s individually rational payos.16
below f, can be obtained as time-average payogs in Nash equilibrium of the inﬁnitely
repeated play of that game. In particular, the “good” outcome (e>e)i ss u s t a i n a b l e –
despite the fact that it is not an equilibrium of the game when played once. Deviations
from prescribed play can be threatened by “minmaxing” the deviator, that is, the
other player randomizes between the two pure strategies in such a way as to minimize
the deviator’s expected payog when the latter plays his or her best reply against this
“punishment.” Such punishments can also sustain other outcomes as equilibria of
the inﬁnitely repeated games, for example alternating play of C and D according
to some prescribed pattern. Applied to more complex games, such punishments can
temporarily force players’ payogs below all Nash equilibrium payog levels in the stage
game J. For example, ﬁrms in repeated quantity (Cournot) competition can punish
deviations from collusive behavior (such as implicit cartel agreements to restrain
output) by temporarily “ﬂooding” the market and thereby forcing proﬁts down to
zero.
In the 1950s, several game theorists had conjectured that rational players should
be able to cooperate–for example play F in the above prisoners’ dilemma–if the
game would only continue long enough (see Section 5.5 in Luce and Raiga, 1957).
Its folklore ﬂavor is the reason why the result came to be referred to as a “Folk
Theorem.” As indicated above, Schelling (1956) deﬁnitely believed the folk wisdom
and deemed it to be empirically relevant. Still, it was Aumann’s precise and general
statement and proof that laid the foundation for subsequent analyses of repeated
interactions. Later, Friedman (1971) established a useful, although partial result
for repeated games: if players discount future payogst oas u ciently small extent,
then outcomes with higher payogs to all players than what they would receive in a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the underlying stage game J can be obtained as
equilibria in the inﬁnitely repeated game.
During the cold war, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler
and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control ne-
gotiations. Their work became the foundation of the theory of repeated games with
incomplete information, that is, repeated games in which all or some of the players
do not know which stage game J is being played, see Aumann and Maschler (1966,
1967, 1968), Stearns (1967) and Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968). For example,17
a ﬁrm might not know a competitor’s costs and a country might not know another
country’s arsenal of military weapons or the other country’s ranking of alternative
agreements. The extension introduces yet another strategic element: incentives to
conceal or reveal private information to other players. How might a person, ﬁrm or
country who has extra information utilize the advantage? How might an ignorant
player infer information known to another player by observing that player’s past ac-
tions? Should an informed player take advantage of the information for short-run
gains, thereby risking to reveal his information to other players, or should he conceal
the information in order to gain more in the future? Building on the work of John
Harsanyi, Aumann, Maschler and Stearns brought game theory to bear on these sub-
tle strategic issues. Their work is collected and commented upon in Aumann and
Maschler (1995).
Aumann and Shapley (1976) and Rubinstein (1976, 1979) reﬁned the analysis of
repeated games with complete information by showing that all feasible and individ-
ually rational outcomes can also be sustained as subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. In
the context of an inﬁnitely repeated game, subgame perfection essentially requires
that the players, in the wake of a unilateral deviation from the equilibrium path of
play, have incentives to play according to the equilibrium. In particular, subgame
perfection requires that no player will ever have an incentive to deviate from punish-
ing a deviator, nor to deviate from punishing a player who deviates from punishing a
player, etc. Many Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect, and it was by no means
clear that such a seemingly stringent reﬁnement would leave intact the entire set of
Nash equilibrium payogs of supergames. Indeed, as Aumann and Shapley showed, if
players discount future payogs, and strive to maximize the expected present value of
their own payog stream, then the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes may be
signiﬁcantly smaller than the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. For while the Nash
equilibrium criterion does not depend on the “costs” of “punishing” deviators, the
subgame perfection criterion does. However, their generalized Folk Theorem estab-
lishes that the distinction between subgame perfect and Nash equilibrium disappears
if there is no discounting.
The theory of repeated games has ﬂourished over the last forty years, and we
now have a much deeper understanding of the conditions for cooperation in ongoing18
relationships. Following a characterization of optimal punishments by Abreu (1988),
it became easier to ﬁnd the set of sustainable equilibrium payogs in repeated games.
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) established Folk Theorems for subgame perfect equilib-
rium in inﬁnitely repeated games with discounting and an arbitrary (ﬁnite) number
of players. Aumann and Sorin (1989) showed that players’ bounded recall can shrink
the set of equilibria to those that are socially ecient, and Abreu, Dutta and Smith
(1994) essentially characterized the class of games for which the Folk Theorem claim
holds under inﬁnite repetition and discounting.
An example of subgame-perfect equilibrium in an inﬁnitely repeated game with
discounting is when q identical ﬁrms with no ﬁxed costs and constant marginal cost
f sell the same product and are engaged in dynamic price competition in a market.
Each ﬁrm announces a price in each period and consumers buy only from the ﬁrm(s)
with the lowest price, with their demand spread evenly over these ﬁrms. If this
interaction took place only once, then the resulting market price would be the same
as under perfect competition: s = f. However, when the interaction takes place
over an indeﬁnite future where proﬁts are discounted at a constant rate, many other
equilibrium outcomes are possible if the discounting is not too severe. For example, all
ﬁrms may start out by setting the monopoly price ˆ sAsand continue doing so until a
price deviation has been detected, from which period on all ﬁrms set the competitive
price s = f. Such as strategy proﬁle constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium if
  1  1@q,w h e r e 5 (0>1) is the discount factor–the factor by which future
proﬁts are discounted each period.23 The more competitors there are, the harsher
is thus the condition on the discount factor–and hence the harder it is to sustain
collusion.
23To see this, let (s) be the industry proﬁt when all ﬁrms quote the same price s,a n da s s u m e
that this function is continuous and unimodal with maximum at s =ˆ s. The strategy proﬁle here
described constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if 1
q(ˆ s)@(1  )i s( w e a k l y )e x c e e d s
(s) for all s?ˆ s. The ﬁrst quantity is the present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt if it continues to set the
collusive price ˆ s, while (s) is the present value of the proﬁt to a ﬁrm if it undercuts the collusive
price by posting a price s?ˆ s – such a ﬁrm will earn zero proﬁt in all future periods because
all ﬁrms will subsequently price at marginal cost. By continuity of the function ,t h er e q u i r e d
inequality holds if and only if A1  1@q. There is no incentive to deviate from punishment of a
deviator, should a deviation occur, since all proﬁts are zero as soon as any ﬁrm quotes s = f.19
Other strands of the literature examine the possibilities of long-term cooperation
when players are impatient and only have access to noisy signals about past behavior;
prominent early contributions include Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti (1990). More recent related contributions concern long-lived players,
as well as imperfect public and private monitoring.24 There is also a literature on
cooperation in ﬁnitely repeated games, that is, when the stage game J is repeated
a ﬁnite number of times. For example, Benoit and Krishna (1985) established Folk-
theorem-like results for repeated games with multiple Nash equilibria when the time
horizon is ﬁnite but long, and Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) showed
that if a prisoners’ dilemma is repeated suc i e n t l ym a n yt i m e si tt a k e so n l yas m a l l
amount of incomplete information about payogs to sustain cooperation most of the
time, although conﬂict will break out in the last couple of rounds. Neyman (1999)
showed that cooperation in a ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma is possible even
under complete information if the time horizon is not commonly known (see below for
a brief discussion of common knowledge in games). Another important contribution to
the literature on repeated games is Axelrod (1984), whose experimental tournaments
suggest that simple strategies such as “tit-for-tat” perform well in populations of
boundedly rational players.
All these subsequent insights owe much to Aumann’s innovative and fundamental
research. When studying cooperation among agents with partly conﬂicting inter-
ests, whether these are ﬁrms in a capitalist marketplace–as in many of the ﬁrst
applications–or farmers sharing a common grassland or irrigation system–as in Os-
trom (1990)–the theory of repeated games is now the benchmark paradigm.
The theory of repeated games helps to explain a wide range of empirical ﬁndings,
notably why it is often harder to sustain cooperation when there are many players,
when players interact infrequently, when there is a high probability that interaction
will cease for exogenous reasons, when the time horizon is short, and when others’
behavior is observed after a delay. Price wars, trade wars and other economic and
social conﬂicts can often be ascribed to one or more of these factors. The repeated-
games framework also sheds light on the existence and functioning of a variety of
24See Fudenberg and Levine (1994), Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori (2002), and
Ely, H¨ orner and Olszewski (2005)20
institutions, ranging from merchant guilds (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994) and
the World Trade Organization (Maggi, 1999) to the maﬁa (Dixit, 2003).
3.2. Other contributions. Aumann has made numerous important contribu-
tions to other aspects of game theory and its application to economics. Here, we only
mention a few of them.
Players’ knowledge about each others’ strategy sets, information and preferences
is of utmost importance for their choice of course of action in a game. Thus it is
natural to ask: What epistemic assumptions imply equilibrium play by rational play-
ers? Game theorists were largely silent on this fundamental question, and economists
carried out equilibrium analyses without worrying too much about it, until Aumann
established the research agenda sometimes called interactive epistemology. In his pa-
per “Agreeing to disagree” (1976), Aumann introduced to game theory the concept of
“common knowledge,” a concept ﬁrst deﬁned by Lewis (1969). An event is common
knowledge among the players of a game if it is known by all players, if all players
know that it is known by all players, if all players know that all players know that it
is known by all players etc., ad inﬁnitum. Roughly, Aumann proved that if two play-
ers have common knowledge about each other’s probability assessments concerning
some event, then these assessments must be identical. Aumann’s counter-intuitive
“agreement result” has had a considerable egect on the theoretical analysis of trade
in ﬁnancial markets, see e.g. Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
In the 1980s, Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) showed that players’ rationality
and their common knowledge of the game and of each others’ rationality does not,
in general, lead to Nash equilibrium, not even in games with a unique Nash equilib-
rium. A decade later, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) established tight sucient
epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium play.
As mentioned above, Aumann deﬁned the concept of strong equilibrium, which
is a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium. In two papers, published in 1974 and 1987, he
also deﬁned another solution concept that is “coarser” than Nash equilibrium: cor-
related equilibrium. Unlike Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium permits players’
strategies to be statistically dependent, and thus Nash equilibrium emerges as the
special case of statistical independence. Such correlation is possible if players can
condition their strategy choice on correlated random variables, such as distinct but21
related observations of the weather, a news event, or some other variable feature of
their environment. In a correlated equilibrium, each player’s conditioned choice is
optimal, given the others’ decision rules.
The set of correlated equilibrium outcomes of a complete-information game also
provides the limits to cooperation when players can communicate freely, possibly
through an impartial mediator, prior to choosing their strategies in the underly-
ing game. When each player’s observed random variable is a recommendation from
an impartial mediator, a correlated equilibrium is a collection of recommendations
such that no player can increase his or her expected payog by a unilateral deviation
from his or her recommendation. In the mobilization game discussed above (see Ta-
ble 1), it can be shown that there are correlated equilibria in which war is avoided
completely, while the negotiation payog pair (e>e) is attained with positive probabil-
ity. To see this, suppose that a mediator recommends exactly one of the countries
to refrain from mobilization with equal probability  for each country, and recom-
mends both to refrain from mobilization with the remaining probability, 1  2.I f
A2e@(2e+df) each country will refrain from mobilization if and only if it receives
this recommendation.25 For a careful discussion of the link between the concept of
correlated equilibrium and the role of communication in games, see Myerson (1991,
Chapter 6).
Aumann (1987) showed that correlated equilibrium can be viewed as a natural
extension of Bayesian decision theory to non-cooperative games. In this interpreta-
tion, rational players (according to the deﬁnition of rationality due to Savage, 1954)
will play a correlated equilibrium if their rationality and their probabilistic priors are
common knowledge.
Aumann also made noteworthy contributions to other areas of economics; one is
his joint work on decision theory with Frank J. Anscombe (Anscombe and Aumann,
1963), another is his continuum model of perfect competition (Aumann 1964, 1966),
a n dat h i r di sh i sj o i n tw o r kw i t hM o r d e c a iK u r za n dA b r a h a mN e y m a no na p p l i c a -
tions of game theory to political economy (Aumann and Kurz, 1977, Aumann, Kurz
25If a country does not receive a recommendation, then it knows that the other country received a
recommendation to refrain, in which case mobilization is optimal. If a country receives a recommen-
dation, then the expected payo of refraining from mobilization is f+( 1 2)e and this exceeds
d, the expected payo of mobilization.22
and Neyman, 1983 and 1987).
4. Recommended readings
The work of Thomas Schelling is accessible also to non-specialists and we recommend
consulting his original publications. Aumann’s writings are highly technical, but
usually also contain easily accessible discussions. See Aumann (1981) for a survey
of the repeated games literature up till then, and Aumann and Maschler (1995) for
a discussion of early work on repeated games with incomplete information. For a
readable and almost entirely non-technical introduction to game theory, see Dixit
and Nalebug (1991); this book discusses long-term cooperation in Chapter 4 and
credible commitments in Chapter 6. For comprehensive books on game theory, see
Dixit and Skeath (2004) for an introductory text and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and
Myerson (1991) for advanced and technical expositions. Aumann’s and Schelling’s
personal (if not necessarily current) views on game theory, may be found in Aumann
(1985) and Schelling (1967). For more bibliographic and personal details about the
two game theorists, see Zeckhauser’s (1989) portrait of Schelling, and Hart’s (2005)
interview with Aumann.
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